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1. Introduction 
In this review essay I argue that there are three aspects of Stephen Jay Gould‟s work both 
relevant and applicable to radical human geography and geographers. First, Gould and 
Lewontin‟s (1979) critique of adaptationism provides a useful foundation for radical thought and 
action free of reactionary constructions such as „survival of the fittest.‟  Second, Gould and 
Eldridge‟s (1977) idea of punctuated equilibrium provides a theoretical framework for the 
application of revolutionary change in society.  Third, Gould‟s assertion (1989, 1996 and 2000) 
that evolution is non-directional (i.e. non-teleological) provides a template for building a better 
society. 
Since the mid-1990s, when I was a geology major at the University of Victoria, I have been a fan 
of Gould.  1990s UVic was radical, with constant political rallies and organizing around 
ecological, feminist and many other issues.  Carmanah was in the air as anarchists, hippies and 
utopian communities worked to save old growth forests on the coast of British Columbia.  
Gould‟s writings were not out of place in this situation.  My attraction to them was more to do 
with geology than with their implicit political content, but I was interested in both.  To some 
extent, I would credit Gould with giving me my first exposure to radical ideas. 
Gould makes mention of his political sympathies in his more popular work, the essays for which 
he became quite famous and which were collected into a number of books over the course of 
three decades.  For instance he often mentioned „punctuated equilibrium‟ which refers to Gould 
and Eldridge‟s challenge to a fundamental principle in geology established by Lyell in the 19th 
century.  That principle is uniformitarianism, the idea that geological change is smooth and 
continuous.  In contrast, punctuated equilibrium represents change measured by catastrophic 
jumps.  This is also related to the question of whether or not species change slowly over time or 
quickly and all at once.  For instance, an event such as a meteorite impact with the earth is 
theorized to have caused the extinction of the dinosaurs (Raup, 1992).  
Radical philosophy would tend to embrace a „saltationist‟ paradigm, in which the discrete jump 
is the mechanism for change in society.  The revolutionary does not look to the status quo of 
contemporary society to fashion tools of change.  Rather, he or she seeks to establish change 
rapid enough to evade reactionary forces interested in protecting that status quo.  This way of 
seeing the world is compatible with punctuated equilibrium. 
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2. The Critique of Adaptationism 
In The Science and Humanism of Stephen Jay Gould, Richard York and Brett Clark (2011) cover 
Gould‟s life work in a way that, like Gould, might at first not seem very radical at all.  For Gould, 
good science always came first, and York and Clark remain true to that ideal.  The authors are 
sociologists but the evenness and detailed comprehensiveness of their knowledge of Gould‟s 
work, not to mention the intricacies of evolutionary theory, is impressive.  They do a very good 
job of explaining complex evolutionary arguments in laymen‟s terms.   
For instance, Gould and Lewontin‟s (1979) concept of the spandrel as a critique of adaptationist 
explanations is particularly well presented by the authors.  Spandrels are spaces between arches 
used for structural support.  A rectangular room with a very high ceiling (e.g. in a large cathedral 
or church) might contain many spandrels between domes or arches near the top of the structure.  
They are purely incidental, but unavoidable, side-features of central support frameworks.  By 
analogy, Gould theorized that physiological features of many organisms were like spandrels.  
York and Clark (2011, p. 60) argue that the human brain is one such feature.  Many aspects of 
the brain can be explained in purely adaptationist terms, such as the ability to speak.  Other 
aspects, such as reading and writing, arose as side effects.   
Evolutionary adaptationists maintain that each and every feature of an organism has been honed 
by natural selection for a specific function defined by environmental context (Fodor and Piatelli-
Palmarini, 2010).  Dawkins (1976) argued that natural selection fits adaptations to environments 
operating at the level of the gene.  So, for instance, the end result of millions of years of 
evolution operating upon the basic genetic framework of the beaver‟s rodent ancestors 
culminates in a host of phenotypes, the physical expressions of genetically defined features, that 
perfectly fits its environment. The beaver‟s teeth, tail and dam, among other features, radiate 
outward from an internal genetic framework. 
In The Extended Phenotype  Dawkins (1982) speculated that human culture might, in fact, be a 
set of extended phenotypes that ultimately start from genetic material, but that pass through 
another selectional filter at the level of the „meme‟.  The latter is a discrete representation of 
cultural information passed vertically from older to younger generations with high enough 
fidelity to preserve useful information necessary for survival.   The theory that human culture 
consists of discrete units is reductionist in the same way that the concept of a selfish gene is 
reductionist, but the former (culture) is posited to be constrained, not defined, by the latter 
(genes).  Critics of Dawkins sometimes make the mistake of assuming a strict single level 
reduction of all phenomena to the level of the gene (see for instance Bunge, 1998, p. 36) but this 
misses the point.   
The popular view of Dawkins is somewhat like the popular view of Darwin insofar as it largely 
consists of misperceptions about what these two authors actually said.  To understand Dawkins 
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(as with Darwin) one must actually read Dawkins thoroughly.  Gould was certainly one of 
Dawkins‟ (and Darwin‟s) most thorough and well-read critics. 
Gould was at pains to demonstrate fallacies and errors in adaptationist thinking.  Dawkins, as a 
self-proclaimed reductionist and materialist, was therefore one of Gould‟s primary targets.  York 
and Clark (2011, p. 85) describe how the idea of convergence crept into neo-Darwinian thinking 
as a natural consequence of strict adherence to a dogma wherein evolution „chooses‟ the same 
basic sets of adapted features over and over again.  For instance, the eye has been re-created 
many times by natural selection.  Local variations (i.e. in the way that pre-eye structures were 
configured) produce global similarities such that all eyes (from the primitive „eye cups‟ of 
submarine worms to the sophisticated eyes of humans)  resemble each other in some 
fundamental ways.   
According to Gould, this view of evolution has served to obscure many more central 
contingencies in the unfolding of the „tape of life‟, that if played over and over again would 
never result in the same trajectory.  Adaptationists on the other hand, people like Dawkins and 
his ally Daniel Dennett, believe that this imaginary tape would, on the contrary, play out in pretty 
much the same way each time evolution „chooses‟ the best designs. 
The narratives and analogies used in debates between Gould and Dawkins can also be used to try 
to explain human history.   A tradition dating back to at least Herbert Spencer was devoted to the 
application of ideas such as „survival of the fittest‟ and other evolutionary clichés to human 
societies.  Gould, perhaps somewhat mistakenly, would almost certainly have placed Dawkins 
within a lineage tracing its descent back to Spencer. The worldview of „sociobiology‟ would thus 
posit that society replete with class inequality, injustice and baseness, is justifiable as an 
unavoidable state resulting from human adaptation resulting in the sorting of individuals based 
on their ability to adapt and compete.  Playing out the tape of human history would result in the 
same stratifications no matter how many times it was played. 
Taking the analogy (that between natural and human history) further, all societies would 
necessarily trend towards inequality and stratification because, like the eye, that state of affairs is 
an ideal optimization selected naturally.  The critique that belies this „argument from the eye‟ 
will be used to show similarly why human societies do not by necessity evolve towards similarly 
unequal states.  That the eye is not always derived independently is evident in the fairly recent 
discovery (York and Clark, 2011, p. 86) of shared genes between organisms that were previously 
thought to have evolved eyes separately and with no communication.  Shared structures underlie 
eyes in organisms as diverse as mollusks and mammals.  Analogously, shared structures of 
human history underlie products of the systematic production of misery due to exploitation and 
greed.  The latter result from dialectical struggles between owners of means of production and 
those whose only ownership is the labour they provide and without which the means of 
production would lie still, barren from lack of use. 
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3. Punctuated Equilibria 
Punctuated equilibrium is the idea that geological change occurs in a non-uniform manner.  
Change through geological time is, according to the theory of punctuated equilibrium, 
characterized by the periodic occurrence of catastrophic events, indicated in the geological 
record by rapid speciation „into‟ the gap opened up by the event, followed by a much longer 
period of quiet or non-change (Huggett, 1990).  Gradual or uniform change, characterized by 
slow change in species composition is, according to this theory, rare (Gould and Eldridge, 1977; 
Raup, 1992).   
Speciation (the appearance in the fossil record of new species) happens quickly and all at once.  
Gaps in the stratigraphic record, previously treated as „no data‟ (Gould and Eldridge, 1977, p. 
116), are synchronized with the tempo of speciation.  In Gould and Eldridge‟s words, “[s]mall 
numbers and rapid evolution virtually preclude the preservation of speciation events in the fossil 
record…” a statement that is here interpreted as meaning that revolutionary change often eludes 
capture even when unsuccessful.  
Changes happening at the fringes of society will in time come to dominate the centre.  In 
nineteen-fifties United States ideas like „free love‟ or „equal rights‟ were most likely considered 
radical by mainstream Americans.  With the advent of accessible birth control and the civil rights 
movement these ideas came to dominate to the point where now they are commonplace.  The 
underlying point is change happens relatively quickly and often it happens in the margins.  
The “Occupy Wall Street” movement offers another case.  Where the impetus for this movement 
began is open to debate.  In keeping with the geological analogy, a large catastrophic event (such 
as a meteorite impact on earth) opens a large phyletic space in the realm of speciational 
possibility.  With the decimation of the dinosaurs due to unforeseen cosmic realities (Raup, 1992) 
came the rise of the mammals.  By analogy, the fall of stable banking systems in the United 
States driven by over-leveraging capital led to the creation of a large space of possibility (albeit 
with very negative consequences) in domains of everyday life in America.  This applies 
especially to young people, who have been hit hard by recent structural societal changes.   
With unemployment at sustained high levels and the value of university education diminishing, 
the „under 30‟ educated segment of society has both the energy and the organizational capacity 
to launch an attack on the powers that be, especially those associated with the banking crises 
starting in 2008.   
The Iraq war‟s eminent demise, returning war veterans with diminishing future prospects and the 
decline of stable social safety nets also adumbrate the makings of both revolutionary protest and 
general disgruntlement.  Without a doubt the potential for change in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement remains latent.  But the message occupiers hope to communicate to the rich and 
powerful remains unrealized, overly distributed among a hodgepodge of grievances.   
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 According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium, movements such as Occupy Wall Street 
should proceed in short sharp bursts.  “Speciational events” would result in the proliferation of 
productive and specialized sub-units splintering from a main group interested in more general 
claims (such as “we are the 99%”) or demands. 
The so-called „battle in Seattle‟ was won through creative or cultural resistance more than the 
creation of a revolutionary vanguard.  But punctuated equilibrium sometimes runs the risk of 
recapitulating features of the adversary it purports to be fighting.  Periodic catastrophic events 
perpetrated by activists, students and revolutionaries is in part what led to the discrediting of 
certain counter-hegemonic tactics in the 1960s and 1970s battle to end the Vietnam War.  That 
struggle, like the present one, was also about economic justice, women‟s and subaltern rights, 
and other concerns, but in the sixties some issues such as racism were fresher and more 
contentious due to the fact that, for instance, fundamental human rights had only recently been 
established during the civil rights movement.   
Big business ultimately played a large part in deciding events that turned the tide against 
extended American presence in Vietnam.  At the same time a movement from the margins 
moved towards the centre.  We now fail to be shocked by the appropriation of public space for 
protest and democratic discussion. 
Origins and outcomes link up together in non-linear ways that are tangled and very difficult to 
sort out.  Scaling back to take in movements from the early sixties until now, the range of 
progressive narratives forms a many-coloured cloth, the braids of which ultimately elude 
illusions of shared goals and directions.   
4. Evolution Without Teleology 
The range of life forms through time are many and various but they do not even begin to exhaust 
the possibilities, and humanity rarely comes out on top.  To assume that replayed „tapes of life‟ 
always end up in the same hierarchies is to indulge in the same kind of hubris that leads to 
racism, sexism and homophobia.  The idea of society „ending up‟ a certain preordained way is no 
different from saying society trends toward that unequal or unjust state as a goal. 
Goal-directed philosophies, or teleologies, such as these have sometimes found a home in the 
realms of human geographic inquiry.  Returning to the example of eyes, The Dictionary of 
Human Geography (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 742-743) has this to say by way of critique (in this 
case of Aristotle‟s teleological logic): 
“…humans do not see because of a series of prior biological processes that produce eyes; 
rather, eyes are produced in order to meet the purpose of seeing.  The teleological end of 
seeing arranges biological conditions such that eyes eventuate.” 
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The same article points out that early Marxist geographers such as Neil Smith used the 
teleological concept of „stages‟ to theorize how societies eventually move past capitalist 
formations to more just and equal socialist societies.   
Wonderful Life, one of Gould‟s most important and widely cited books, takes on the idea of 
teleology in evolution using the Burgess Shale as a model.  Progressive theories of evolution 
assume increasing diversity and complexity through time.  The suite of organisms found in the 
Burgess Shale, a series of outcrops high in the Rocky Mountains on the border between BC and 
Alberta, Canada, suggest that this assumption is unfounded.   
The fossils associated with the Burgess Shale represent such an incredible diversity and 
complexity of life that the speciational event associated with the early Cambrian period has come 
to be known as the “Cambrian explosion.”  The separation between the Precambrian and the 
Cambrian marks the evolution of life from single- to multi-cellular forms with hard, and thus 
preservable, parts.  The amount of time that has passed between the Cambrian explosion and 
now is approximately one tenth of the time of the entire history of the planet. 
One of Gould‟s most famous constructs, that of the „tape of life,‟ gets extensive use in Wonderful 
Life.  As already alluded to above, the tape of life is a metaphor or thought experiment for 
thinking through evolution as a whole.  It lets us ask „what if‟ the „tape of life‟ were played over 
again?  Would it result in the same diversity and/or alleged hierarchy of life forms that we see 
today on earth?  Gould argues that with each re-play of the tape of life we will get a wholly 
different result, which is equivalent to saying that evolution is non-teleological.  The organisms 
of the Burgess Shale provide empirical evidence corroborating this claim.  The number of phyla 
and diversity of forms within each phylum in the Burgess Shale demonstrate that diversity as 
measured between phyla seems to have decreased at certain moments in natural history. 
York and Clark (2011, p. 62) write specifically about Wonderful Life in The Science and 
Humanism of Stephen Jay Gould.  They note that in addition to working against human hubris, 
Gould‟s theory stresses how structural constraints established early in evolutionary history serve 
to restrict the set of possible body plans of phyla developed later in that history.  The point here 
is that adaptation and natural selection do not have complete freedom to act.  Structural 
constraints limit the possibility space of natural selection to a significant degree. 
The inferences of non-teleology and structural constraint for radical human geography should 
now be becoming a little bit clearer.  These inferences rely upon arguments from analogy.  
Arguments from analogy are limited, but one strength they possess is heuristic. The „shape‟ of 
natural history can be used as a heuristic analogy for examining the „shape‟ of human history.   
I have also been relying upon arguments from authority, but arguments from analogy and 
authority are not enough.  Logical analysis requires more and with this in mind I now turn to 
some features of human history that can be logically informed by evolutionary history, a nascent 
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interdisciplinary field of inquiry that has only recently begun to produce interesting findings.  
For human history to plausibly be anything like natural history human culture and society must 
possess some kind of information upon which evolutionary processes work.  Organisms house 
DNA which in turn consists of genetic material that has been passed on from generation to 
generation from time immemorial.  Cultures and societies, on the other hand, possess no obvious 
material parallel to the gene.  Dawkins (1976 and 1982) has suggested the term „meme‟ as a unit 
of cultural information transmitted between human generations.   
York and Clark correctly perceive Dawkins work and, by extension, his notion of the meme, to 
be reductionistic.  York and Clark do not disavow the meme specifically, but they do make the 
mistake of conflating the reductionistic science of Dawkins with what they call sociobiology 
(York and Clark, 2011, p. 139). The latter ignores human history, culture and society as side 
effects of genetically determined structures of human behaviour.  But the emergence of higher 
order phenomena is no less hindered in human realms by, for instance, art consisting of 
elementary particles of culture than is the rhinoceros, in the non-human animal realm, from 
developing its distinct body shape and behaviours from a specific configuration of complex 
molecules.  
What Gould and his allies Eldridge and Lewontin stress is that reductionism does not take 
emergence seriously enough.  Reductionism places the stress at the wrong level and essentially 
ignores variables available for selection at group or species levels.  Human societies and whole 
cultures think or act in a diversity of ways.  Revolutionary events in Paris will play out 
differently than they will in Seattle, Sao Paulo or Beijing.  Different movements (a movement of 
movements if you will) across both time and space will have commonalities as well.  The point is 
that the movements will not, cannot, always act towards the same goals.  Play the tape of human 
history out many times and you will see a range of outcomes, hierarchies and consequences 
emerge. 
5. Revolutionary Evolution 
The legacy of the life and work of Stephen Jay Gould for radical human geography has three 
main aspects.  These are 1. a critique of adaptationism („survival of the fittest‟) using the 
architectural analogy of the spandrel 2. punctuated equilibrium, or the idea that historical change 
occurs catastrophically, very quickly and in a relatively short period of time and 3. the non-
teleology (lack of goal orientation or directionality) of evolution.  To summarize, these aspects 
inform radical human geography in the following ways. 
First, the critique of adaptationism, most succinctly summed up by the phrase „survival of the 
fittest‟ is one of Gould‟s (and Lewontin‟s) most famous and accessible ideas.  York and Clark 
aptly focus upon the spandrel, elucidating the ways in which „spaces between‟ main structures 
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may themselves be selected and developed through time.  Between main structural constraints lie 
possible future mainstreams.   
For radical human geographers this is cause for hope.  Turning adversity into strength, processes 
of marginalization by forces of the status quo foster new means for radical theorization and 
organization.  The „architecture,‟ if you will, of mainstream society provides both confining 
structure (the building‟s arch) and also space for creativity and movement (the spaces between 
the arches, or the spandrels).   
Second, punctuated equilibrium is one of Gould‟s (and Eldridge‟s) most important concepts for 
the discipline of paleontology and, by extension, geology, natural history, and human history.  
Keeping in mind dangers of applying geological analogies to human society (the latter operating 
at a much smaller time scale), there are very useful aspects of punctuated equilibrium upon 
which radical human geographers might draw. 
The terms „radical‟ and „revolutionary‟ indicate a manner of achieving societal or cultural 
change quite different in character from those that are more „moderate‟ or „liberal.‟  The former, 
not satisfied with a status quo that maintains inequalities and injustices, insists upon seizing the 
ripe moment in history.  Punctuated equilibrium is perfectly in keeping with these aims. York 
and Clark fail to do justice to this aspect of Gould‟s work, despite demonstrating deep 
understanding of Gould‟s magnum opus, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. 
Third, non-teleology is possibly one of the least well-understood aspects of Gould‟s work 
because it is the most abstractly philosophical.  The idea of replaying the „tape of life‟ is a theme 
that runs throughout Gould‟s work.  It is a boon to radical human geographers because it very 
succinctly upsets the status quo.  Conservatives and reactionaries would like to believe that 
current inequalities or injustices are the fault of their victims.  Hierarchies between humans are 
naturalized and constructed as „right.‟  Replaying the tape of life (or in this case the „tape of 
human history‟) under this paradigm would result in exactly the same orders of suffering. 
The radical human geographer might use tools of Gould‟s thinking to bring another way of 
thinking to bear upon societal problems.  Replaying the tape of human history would thus result 
in non-hierarchical societies as often as it would result in their opposite.  The strength of this way 
of thinking is that it is both non-dogmatic and logical.  Used properly and thoughtfully this is one 
of the most powerful tools in the revolutionary thinker‟s toolbox. 
York and Clark, with hesitations noted above, have done admirable justice to the life and work of 
Stephen Jay Gould in this book.  They distil the essence of Gould‟s thought in laymen‟s terms 
without dumbing down.  Radical ideas are presented scientifically.  This book is highly 
recommended as an introduction for those new to Gould, for those already familiar with his work 
desiring a useful synopsis, and for those wishing to learn new aspects or ways of viewing the 
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ideas and implications of one of the most distinguished and beloved of thinkers, teachers and 
writers of the past few decades. 
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